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PART IV 
Adjective Law 
CHAPTER 27 
Evidence 
WALTER H. MCLAUGHLIN, JR. and JOHN S. LEONARD 
§27.1. Insanity defense: Expert testimony and permissible infer-
ences. In Commonwealth v. Smith} the defendant was tried a second 
time2 for an atrocious sexual assault-murder of a five-year-old female 
and was found guilty.3 At trial, the defendant raised insanity as a de-
fense.4 The only testimony concerning his mental condition came 
from two psychiatrists, the only two witnesses for the defense. The de-
fendant did not testify, and he waived his right to make an unsworn 
statement to the jury after the close of the evidence. Each psychiatrist 
concluded his testimony on direct examination by stating that, in his 
opinion, the defendant was insane within the meaning of Common-
wealth v. McHoul5 on the date of the alleged crime. At the close of 
WALTER H. McLAUGHLIN, JR. and JOHN S. LEONARD are partners in the firm of 
McLaughlin Brothers, Boston. Mr. McLaughlin is also an Instructor in Law at 
Boston University Law School. 
§27.1. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 409, 258 N.E.2d 13. 
2 An appeal of the original conviction resulted in reversal due not to legal 
error at trial but to (I) the Supreme Judicial Court's restatement of the law of 
insanity as affecting criminal responsibility in Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 
Mass. 544, 226 N.E.2d 556 (1967), and (2) the possibility of prejudicial pretrial 
publicity. Commonwealth v. Smith, 353 Mass. 487, 232 N.E.2d 915 (1968). 
3 The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree with a 
recommendation that the sentence of death not be imposed. See G.L., c. 265, §2. 
4 "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such con-
duct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to 
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct 
to the requirements of the law." Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 546-547, 
226 N.E.2d 556, 557-558 (1967). 
5 Id. at 544, 226 N.E.2d at 556 (1967), noted in 1967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §9.16. 
In Smith, both of the defendant's experts testified that Smith had a long history 
of abnormal sexual activity (Record at 546-552) and an extremely strong sex 
drive (Record at 580). However, one expert testified that the defendant showed no 
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all the evidence, the defendant excepted to the denial of his motions 
that the jury be directed to return verdicts of "Not Guilty ... by 
reason of insanity." The defendant argued that all the evidence per-
taining to insanity indicated that he was legally insane at the time 
of the commission of the crime; accordingly, the jury was compelled, 
as a matter of law, to find the defendant not guilty by reason of 
insanity, and the trial judge was so compelled to direct the jury to 
return such a verdict. 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court stated that, while the Com-
monwealth had the burden of proving the defendant sane at the 
time of the crime alleged against him, the prosecution did not neces-
sarily have to present evidence that the defendant was sane in order to 
secure a valid conviction. The Court reasoned that the jury is the sole 
judge of the credibility and weight of all the evidence on the issue of 
insanity and, in Smith, was not required to accept as conclusive the 
opinions of the two psychiatrists, even though no contrary . opinions 
were introduced at trial.6 As an additional basis for its decision, the 
Court invoked and reaffirmed the rationale of Commonwealth v. 
Clark/ that is, that "although the burden of proof is on the Common-
wealth to prove the defendant mentally responsible for crime . . . 
the fact that a great majority of men are sane, and the probability that 
any particular man is sane, may be deemed by a jury to outweigh, in 
evidential value, testimony that he is insane."8 Moreover, the Court 
explained that the Clark rule does not merely create a presumption in 
favor of sanity which disappears at the moment evidence to the 
contrary is introduced. Rather, the jury may draw a permissible in-
ference that the defendant is sane from their common knowledge of 
the fact that a great majority of men are sane and of the probability 
that any particular man is sane.9 Some of the factors which a jury 
may consider in deciding whether to draw the inference of sanity 
under the Clark rule include the presence of such circumstances as 
anger, revenge, rejection, jealousy, hatred, insult, and intoxication, any 
signs of an overt psychosis upon examination on August 11, 1965. His initial 
diagnosis was sociopathic personality disorder with sexual deviation (Record at 619). 
It was not until after a second period of observation on October 26, 1965, that a 
final diagnosis in agreement with the other expert opinion (namely, schizophrenic 
reaction of a chronic undifferentiated type, moderate, long term, with prominent 
depressive features, mild paranoid features and sociopathic personality disorder 
with sexual deviation) was reached (Record at 625). Both experts agreed· that it 
was possible that defendant's commitment to the Massachusetts Correctional In-
stitution at Bridgewater could tend to precipitate or exacerbate an existing or 
previously existing illness. 
6 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 409, 418-419, 258 N.E.2d 13, 19-20. 
7 292 Mass. 409, 415, 198 N.E. 641, 645 (1935). 
8 Ibid. 
9 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 409, 419, 258 N.E.2d, 13, 20. The Clark decision is cited in 
Connolly v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 322 Mass. 678, 681-682, 79 N.E.2d 
189, 191 (1948), and Krantz v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins, Co., 335 Mass. 703, 712, 
141 N.E.2d 719, 725 (1957). 
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or all of which might account for a murderous act by a sane person. 
However, in the last analysis the jury is the sole judge of the factual 
issue of sanity.lo 
While the Smith opinion appears to be supported by the technical 
rules of law enunciated in the case law, the result appears at variance 
with both the rationale and the sense of compassion evidenced in 
earlier discussions. 
The Smith case is distinguishable from Commonwealth v. Francis11 
and Commonwealth v. Ctark12 in that the defendants in the latter 
cases testified, thus affording the jury the opportunity to observe their 
attitudes, demeanor, responsiveness and reaction under cross-examina-
tion and to weigh these observations against expert opinion of in-
sanity; in Smith, however, the defendant was merely present in the 
courtroom. Additionally, in Commonwealth v. Ricardp unlike Smith, 
there was evidence of provocation which could have led a sane man to 
perform the murderous act. Furthermore, while there was unanimous, 
uncontradicted psychiatric evidence of insanity in Francis, Smith not 
only failed to testify but also waived his right to make an unsworn 
statement to the jury. 
The facts of the Smith case closely approximate those of Common-
wealth v. Cox.14 In Cox, the defendant, after the brutal and premedi-
tated murder of his wife, called the police and signed a confession. At 
10 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 420, 258 N.E.2d at 21. 
11 355 Mass. 108, 243 N.E.2d 169 (1969), noted in 1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§19.5, wherein the defendant was charged and convicted of murder in the first 
degree. At trial, two defense experts testified as to defendant's mental incapacity; 
a prosecution expert, on direct examination, stated the defendant had met the 
tests of substantial capacity defined in the McHoul case, but later contradicted 
himself on cross-examination. The defendant testified at length as to his move-
ments and motive prior to the killing. The Court held that when expert 
evidence conflicts on the matter of sanity, the decision is to be left to the jury. 
The Court distinguished Commonwealth v. Cox, 327 Mass. 609, 100 N.E.2d 14 
(1951), asserting that, in Francis, the jury had before it the activity of the defen-
dant before and after the crime as well as the opportunity to see and hear the 
defendant on the stand. 
12 292 Mass. 409, 198 N.E. 641 (1935), wherein the defendant was convicted of a 
brutal murder in the first degree. Expert witnesses for the defendant and Common-
wealth disagreed as to the nature and extent of defendant's mental illness. The 
defendant testified extensively on his life, work, and habits. The Court affirmed 
the conviction, emphasizing the jury's ability to form an opinion as to mentality 
based upon his testimony on the witness stand. 
13 355 Mass. 509, 246 N.E.2d 433 (1969), wherein a chronic alcoholic, by means 
of an ambush, killed a man with whom he had an altercation and fight in a bar 
earlier in the evening. The only medical expert testified that the defendant lacked 
substantial capacity as defined in McHoul but that it was possible, though not 
probable, that the defendant was sane. The Court affirmed the conviction, ruling 
that the jury should weigh "the fact that a great majority of men are sane, and 
the probability that any particular man is sane." The Court emphasized the 
evidence of provocation that could lead a sane man to perform the murderous 
act. 
14 327 Mass. 609, 100 N.E.2d 14 (1951). 
3
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trial, the defendant did not testify and called as his only witnesses two 
psychiatrists, both of whom testified, without contradiction, that the 
defendant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime. As 
in Smith, the defendant in Cox argued that the uncontradicted testi-
mony of the psychiatrists required, as a matter of law, a directed ver-
dict of not guilty by reason of insanity. Though this contention was 
rejected, the Supreme Judicial Court, observing the extraordinary 
facts and lack of motive, stated: 
... The only issue in the case was the criminal responsibility 
of the defendant. The only direct testimony on this issue came 
from two psychiatrists who had examined the defendant in the 
course of their official duties, one under the so·called Briggs law, 
and the other as medical director of the institution to which the 
defendant was committed. Each psychiatrist testified to his 
opinion, which we have accepted as an expression of a belief that 
the defendant was not criminally responsible at the time of the 
killing. There was no medical testimony that he was responsible. 
The fact that most men are sane, and a rational probability that 
the defendant, too, may have been sane on February 21, 1948, 
notwithstanding what he then did and later said about it, seem 
to us inadequate reasons upon which to disregard this unanimous 
medical opinion that he was not. In the opinion of a majority of 
the court, the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and 
there should be a new trial.15 
In Commonwealth v. Smith, however, the Court, noting that the 
defendant had two complete, error-free trials before a different judge 
and jury, both addressing the same issue, refused to rule that the 
jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence or that justice 
required a new triaJ.16 
While the Smith case did not evoke a dissenting opinionP the Court 
was unnecessarily placed in the awkward position of going one step 
beyond the Cox rationale. The district attorney knew of defendant's 
15 Id. at 615, 100 N.E.2d at 17. 
161970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 409, 422, 258 N.E.2d 13, 22. 
17 See Commonwealth v. Francis, 355 Mass. 108, 243 N.E.2d 169 (1969), wherein, 
despite the testimony of the defendant, and conflicting medical opinion, Justices 
Whittemore and Cutter in dissent stated: "As we read the transcript, the expert 
for the Commonwealth gave his only adequately informed opinion on cross·ex-
amination. He then agreed with the two experts called by the defendant that the 
defendant was affected with paranoid schizophrenia and lacked substantial capacity 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. In all the circumstances we 
would order a new trial under G.L. c. 278, §33E, as amended. These include the 
risk of the jury misunderstanding some of the expert medical opinion, the ex-
tended medical history of the defendant's disease (a 1963 report stated that he 
was 'potentially homicidal'), and, in the light of the history, the evidential sig-
nificance of the dreadful killing itself as an act inexplicable if tested by normal 
conduct." 355 Mass. at 112, 243 N.E.2d at 172. 
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reliance on the insanity defense and failed, or was unable, to introduce 
affirmative evidence of Smith's sanity. If the Commonwealth merely 
chose not to introduce psychiatric evidence of sanity, such lack of 
diligence and proper preparation of the case is reprehensible. If the 
district attorney could not secure affirmative medical evidence of the 
defendant's sanity, then he should not have prosecuted Smith as a 
sane man. As a result of the district attorney's preparation and presen-
tation of the Commonwealth's case, the jury was compelled to deter-
mine the issue of sanity based upon mere probability. In the absence 
of affirmative evidence of sanity, such procedure must be considered 
highly suspect. Jurors of necessity will be affected by the manner of 
men they are, their attitudes towards crime and insanity, which they 
bring with them from the popular culture, and the extent to which 
they know the consequences- for the defendant and for society- of 
a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.1s Moreover, it must be 
recognized that the law offers little assistance to jurors in resolving 
issues of sanity. It leaves them very much to their own devices in ap-
praising conflicts in credibility, in choosing among experts and their 
testimony. The little assistance they receive comes to them at the 
close of the trial through the judge's instructions- those dealing with 
the insanity defense itself and those dealing with burden of proof and 
presumptions. However, due to the Commonwealth's poorly developed 
case and the absence of psychiatric evidence of defendant's sanity, the 
Smith rationale, rather than focusing the jury's attention upon the 
evidence, allows an instruction concerning the drawing of permissible 
inferences of sanity that can be easily misunderstood by the uniniti-
ated juror and abused by the prejudiced juror.19 More importantly, 
the Smith opinion lessens both the trial and appellate courts' control 
of the decision-making process in criminal prosecutions in which the 
insanity defense is raised- an undesirable result where the possible 
sentence of death is involved. It is hoped that the Court, in future 
cases, will delineate guidelines requiring the introduction of affirma-
tive evidence of sanity by the Commonwealth in order to promote 
fuller presentation of the sanity issue and fairer trials. 
§27.2. Impeachment by conviction of crime: Not a matter of trial 
judge's discretion. The question of the discretion of the trial judge 
to receive or exclude evidence of impeachment by proof of prior con-
viction, pursuant to G.L., c. 233, §21, was decided in Commonwealth 
v. West.1 In West, the defendant was indicted for armed robbery and 
related offenses.2 At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's case, the 
18 Goldstein, The Insanity Defense 5 (1967). 
19 See 1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §19.5, at 510-514. 
§27.2. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 495, 258 N.E.2d 22. 
2 The related offenses were assault with intent to murder and assault and battery 
by means of a dangerous weapon arising out of the robbery of a bank in which a 
police officer was shot. 
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defendant asked the trial· judge to rule that, if he elected· to· testify, 
his prior six convictions, all for robbery, would not be received in 
evidence for impeachment purposes. The prosecutor opposed the 
motion. The trial judge doubted whether he had any discretion to 
exclude this evidence, but, if he did, he would not exercise his discre- . 
tion in the defendant's favor under the obtaining circumstances.3 The 
defendant did not testify and was convicted. 
On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, the defendant argued 
that, since the Massachusetts statute governing the admissibility of 
prior convictions to affect credibility is not phrased in mandatory 
terms,4 the trial judge is not required to allow impeachment by evi-
dence of prior conviction(s) and that, in this specific instance, the 
judge abused his discretion in refusing to exclude the evidence; The 
Court ruled that when the statute provides that a prior conviction 
of a witness "may be shown" to impeach credibility, it is speaking of 
an option open to the party cross-examining the witness. The word 
"may" in the statute does not clothe the trial judge with the discretion 
to receive or exclude such evidence. The statute used the word "may" 
instead of "shall" to indicate that the right to introduce evidence of 
this type and purpose belongs to the cross-examiner, but· that he is not 
obliged to offer it.G. 
In so holding, the Court noted the existence of contrary authority 
construing similar statutes6 and adopted without discussion the ra-
tionale of a New Jersey case, State v. Hawthorne.7 Specifically, at early 
3 A motion for a ruling that, if defendant took the stand, the prosecution 
would be permitted to introduce only one record of conviction was similarly denied. 
4 General Laws, c. 2!13, §21, in pertinent part, provides that "the conviction, of a 
witness of a crime may be shown to affect his c:redibility," subject to exceptions 
not here material. (Emphasis added.) See 1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §19.1, at 
499-502. . 
li 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 495, 498, 258 N.E.2d 22, 24. 
6 See, e.g., State v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130, 228 A.2d 682 (1967), holding Jhat 
the option to introduce such testimony belonged solely to the parties and, when 
exercised, the Court must receive the evidence. Cf. Luck v. United States, 348 F:2d 
76!1, 767-768 (D.C. Cir. 1965), wherein the court ruled:. "Section 305 is not written 
in mandatory terms. It says, in effect, that the conviction 'may/ as opposed to 
'shall,' be admitted; and we think the choice of words in this instance is 
significant. The trial court is not required to allow impeachment by prior con-
viction every time a defendant takes the stand in his own defense. The statute, in 
our view, leaves room for the operation of a sound judicial discretion to play 
upon the circumstances as they unfold in a particular case. There may well be 
cases where the trial judge might think that the cause of truth would be 
helped more by lettinlt the jury hear the defendant's story than by the de· 
fendant's foregoing that opportunity becauSe of the_ fear of prejudice founded 
upon a prior conviction. There may well be other cases where the trial judge 
believes the prejudicial effect of impeachment far outweighs the probative rele-
vance of the prior conviction to the issue of credibility .. This. la.st is, of course, 
a standard which trial judges apply every day in other contexts: and we think 
it has both utility and applicability in this field." 
7 49 N.J. 1!10, 228 A.2d 682 (1967). 
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common law, the mere conviction of. a person disqualified him as a 
witness. The legislature, feeling that total disqualification was too 
harsh a sanction, directed that a convicted person could be admitted 
as a witness if he chose to testify. However, if he did take the witness 
stand, his convictions of crime "may" be used to affect his credibility. 
In this historical context, "may" denotes a right in the cross-examiner 
and not discretion in the trial judge. 
While the Supreme Judicial Court may have felt bound by the 
historical accuracy of the Hawthorne rationale, such reasoning is 
nevertheless based upon a questionable premise which fails to require 
any demonstrable connection between the crime of which the defen-
dant was earlier convicted and the present truth-telling capacity of 
the witness.8 Moreover, when dealing with independent past criminal-
ity, the possibility of a massive prejudicial impact upon the juryo-
one which cannot be cured by a limiting instruction10 - is distinct. 
Lastly, a vehicle for effecting substantial justice by allowing the dis, 
cretion and reason of an experienced trial judge to properly balance 
the interests of the defendant and the public has been lost. Unfor-
tunately, after West, the only practical alternative lies in amending 
G.L., c. 233, §21 to provide that impeachment by prior conviction of 
witnesses in civil or criminal proceedings be left to the sound discre-
tion of the trial judge, whose ruling may be reviewed by the Supreme 
Judicial Court only for abuse of such discretion. It is submitted that 
such an amendment should be promptly made. 
§27.3. Impeachment by conviction of crime: Manner of impeach-
ment: Expansion. The manner in which impeachment by prior con-
viction is effected was considered in Commonwea. th v. Connory.1 In 
Connolly, the defendants were tried for murder in the first degree. At 
trial, the defendant, Connolly, took the stand, During his cross-
examination, several records of previous convictions were offered to 
impeach his credibility. In each instance, the prosecutor asked Con-
nolly if he was the person named in the record and, after establishing 
this fact, introduced the record into evidence. The prosecutor then 
asked Connolly if he was the same person who pleaded not guilty to 
s Hughes, Evidence, 19 Mass. Practice Series 286 (1961); see Gertz v. Fitchburg 
R.R., 137 Mass. 77 (1884). 
9 See opinion of Jacobs, J., dissenting in part, in State v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. at 
148, 228 A.2d at 691. See also Richards v. United States, 192 F.2d 602, 605 (D.C. 
Cir. 1951); Schaefer, Police Interrogation and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion, 61 Nw. U.L. Rev. 506, 512 (1966); Kalven and Zeisel, The American Jury 124, 
126-130, 144-146 (1966). 
10 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949); Bruton v. United States, 
391 U.S. 123, 128 (1968); United States ex re1. Sco1eri v. Banmiller, 310 F.2d 720, 
725 (3d Cir. 1962), cert; denied, 374 U,S.· 828 (1963); Pinkney v. United States, 363 
F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of 
Balancing and Other Matters, 70 Yale L.J. 763 {1961);· Note, The Limiting Instruc-
tion- Its Effectiveness and Effect, 51 Minn. L. Rev. 264 (1966). 
§27.3. 11970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 63, 255 N.E.2d 191: 
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charges of assaulting a named female person with intent to commit 
rape, and did in fact rape her but later retracted the plea of not 
guilty, pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of assault and battery, and 
was sentenced to two years in the house of correction therefor.2 De-
fense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial. However, the court 
allowed the question and denied defendant's motion for a mistrial. 
On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, the defendant argued 
that the question was prejudicial in that it informed the jury that 
Connolly had been charged with the crime of rape when he had only 
been convicted of the lesser included offense of assault and battery. 
It was also averred that mention of the victim's name was highly 
prejudicial in that there was a possibility that members of the jury 
could have known or even been related to this girl. 
According to the majority opinion, in matters of impeachment of 
credibility through evidence of convictions for prior crimes, the only 
evidence admissible is the record of the conviction itsel£.3 However, the 
Court then stated: 
... It is obvious that the prosecutor was attempting to show a 
conviction by the only method available to him, namely, by read-
ing the record of the conviction, and upon the defendant's admis-
sion that he was the person named therein, by introducing it in 
evidence. The defendant Connolly does not contend that the 
prosecutor was not reading from the record, or that the matter 
objected to was not contained in it. What the prosecutor was at-
tempting to do was in compliance with the law and the judge 
did not err in allowing the question.4 
Justice Kirk, concurring in the result, disagreed with the implica-
tion in the majority opinion that the record of conviction, which is 
read to the jury, may include an accusation of a crime of which the 
witness had not been found guilty or to which he had not pleaded 
guilty. Accusations which may appear in the certified record are 
irrelevant to the fact of conviction and the certified copy should not 
go to the jury room unless the extraneous prejudicial accusations are 
expunged.~> However, no reversible error was committed because, in 
2 The prosecutor asked the following question: "Sir, are you the same Daniel 
Connolly ..• (as to whom it was charged that] on the 29th day of July, 1963 ... 
[he] did assault Beverly Neubert with intent to commit rape upon her and her, 
the said Beverly Neubert, did commit rape upon, and ... (who] on September the 
12th- .•. in Essex Superior Court, number 53742, .•. pleaded not guilty, and 
during the trial on October the lith, 1963, •.. retracted the plea of not 
guilty, and pleaded guilty to assault and battery ••• and ••. [was] sentenced 
to two years in the House of Correction, are you that same perst>n, sir." Id. at 
70·71, 255 N.E.2d at 197. 
aId. at 71, 255 N.E.2d at 197-198. 
4 Ibid. 
li Justice Kirk noted that his statement of the law "should be and probably is 
observed in the Superior Court." Id. at 74, 255 N.E.2d at 199-200. 
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the opinion of Justice Kirk, the transcript was susceptible of the 
interpretation that Connolly's counsel did know of the objectionable 
feature and permitted it to be read, hoping to thereby secure a mis-
trial.6 
The majority opinion in Connolly appears to be inconsistent with 
the rationale of the Massachusetts rule that, since the impeacher is 
precluded from showing the details of the prior crime or circumstances 
of aggravation by proof outside the record of conviction, so also the 
impeached is precluded from offering evidence in explanation of the 
fact of conviction.7 Yet to allow the prosecutor to introduce evidence 
of a crime of which the defendant had not been found guilty would 
logically require that the impeached, in fairness, be allowed to con-
tradict this evidence. 
The Connolly opinion, strictly construed, also appears to conflict 
with the general rule that a defendant, on cross-examination, may not 
be questioned as to whether he participated in unrelated specific acts 
of criminal conduct not resulting in a conviction, as such evidence 
has no relevancy to the issue of the defendant's guilt and is likely 
to be so prejudicials as to preclude correction by a limiting instruc-
tion.9 For similar reasons, inquiry into the details of crimes such as 
the name of the victim and aggravating circumstances is not per-
mitted.10 The fact that the accusation in the principal case involved 
a related offense hardly constitutes a distinction meriting a substantial 
revision of settled law, thereby necessitating the undesirable inquiry 
and testimony on collateral issues merely to avoid undue prejudice.ll 
In the interests of fairer and faster trials, it is hoped that Justice 
Kirk's opinion is in fact the rule observed in the Superior Court. 
Otherwise, a clarification of the cryptic majority opinion will be neces-
sary to prevent undue prejudice to criminal defendants. 
6 Id. at 76, 255 N.E.2d at 200. In all, ten records of convictions were read. In 
each, except the one in dispute, the witness had pleaded guilty to the charge as 
framed in the indictment. Id. at 75 n.3, 255 N.E.2d at 200 n.3. 
7 Lamoureux v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 169 Mass. 338, 47 N.E. 1009 (1897), 
wherein the Supreme Judicial Court held that convictions must be left unex-
plained, because to allow parties to make explanations would lead to complex 
inquiries into collateral issues. 
8 See United States v. Rudolph, 403 F.2d 805, 806 (6th Cir. 1968). See also 
United States v. King, 378 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1967); United States v. Benson, 369 
F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1966); Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1966); 
Hurst v. United States, 337 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1964); Thurman v. United States, 
316 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1963); Manley v. United States, 238 F.2d 221 (6th Cir. 1956); 
Pierce v. United States, 86 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1936). 
9 United States v. Smith, 403 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1968); Courtney v. United States, 
390 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1968); Odom v. United States, 377 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1967). 
See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Marshall v. United States, 
360 u.s. 310 (1959). 
10 See Commonwealth v. Galligan, 155 Mass. 54, 28 N.E. 1129 (1891); Gertz v. 
Fitchburg R.R. Co., 137 Mass. 77 (1884). 
11 See Lamoureux v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 169 Mass. 338, 47 N.E. 1009 (1897). 
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· §27.4. · Legislation: Witness· inunuliity. General Laws, c. 233, has 
been amended by the legislature to provide for the grant of immunity 
to witnesses required to testify or produce evidence before a grand jury 
and at trial thereafter.l The immunity statute provides that in any 
proceeding before a grand jury involving specified offenses,2 after the 
witness has claimed his constitutional privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, the attorney general or a district attorney may make an applica-
tion to a justice of the Supreme Judicial Court for an order granting 
immunity to the witness. If, after a privat.e hearing, the justice finds 
.that the witness did validly refuse to answer questions or produce 
evidence on grounds of self-incrimination, then the justice may order 
the witness to answer the questions or produce the evidence requested 
by issuing an order granting immunity.3 Furthermore, at the time 
for trial, if a witness has been previously granted immunity by a justice 
of the Supreme Judicial Court concerning his testimony or produc-
tion of evidence before a grand jury, then a judge of the Superior 
Court, on motion by the district attorney or attorney general, may 
issue an order granting immunity to such witness, as long as the wit-
ness refuses to testify or _produce evidence on the ground that the testi-
§27.4. 1 Acts of 1970, c. 408, amending G.L., c. 233, by inserting §§20C-20I after 
§20B. It should be noted that the power to grant immunity is neither implied nor 
inherent in the governmental power to investigate. Consequently, government 
officials and courts are without inherent power to grant immunity to a witness 
and thereby compel him to testify over his proper assertion of the privilege 
against self-incrimination. However, the legislative power, being derived from the 
Constitution, carries with it the inherent power to investigate, and. to compel the 
giving Qf testimony which might incriminate the witness, provided immunity be 
accorded to him commensurate with the scope of the constitutional privilege 
against self-incrimination. Hughes, Evidence, 19 Mass. Practice Series 145 (1961). 
2 The enumerated crimes are as follows: abortion, arson, assault and battery to 
collect a loan, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, assault to 
murder, breaking and entering a dwelling house or a building, bribery, burning of 
a building or dwelling house or other property, burglary, counterfeiting, deceptive 
advertising, electronic eavesdropping, embezzlement, extortion, firearm violations, 
forgery, fraudulent personal injury and property damage claims, violation of the 
gaming laws, gun registration violations, intimidation of a witness or of a juror, 
insurance law violations, kidnapping, larceny, lending of money or thing of 
value in violation of· the general laws, liquor law violations, mayhem, murder, 
violation of the narcotic or harmful drug laws, perjury, prostitution, violations of 
:environmental control laws (pollution), violations of conflicts-of-interest laws, con-
sumer protection laws, pure food and drug law violations, receiving stolen property, 
robbery, subornation of perjury, uttering, being an accessory to any of the fore-
going offenses and conspiracy or attempt or solicitation to commit any of the 
foregoing offenses. G.L., c. 233, §20D. 
3 Id. §20E. This section also provides that if the application is made by a 
district attorney, he shall at least three days before. the date for hearing upon 
his application give notice by certified mail to the attorney general and each other 
district attor.ney in the Co111monwealth who may file appearances and have the 
right to be heard at the hearing. 
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mony or evidence would tend to incriminate him or subject him to a 
penalty or a forfeiture.4 
A witness who has been granted immunity cannot be prosecuted or 
subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for, or on account of, any trans-
action, matter, or thing concerning which he is compelled to testify 
after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination. Neither 
can such testimony obtained under the immunity statute be used as 
evidence in any criminal or civil proceeding in any court of the Com-
monwealth except in prosecutions for perjury or contempt committed 
while giving testimony or producing evidence under compulsion 
pursuant to the statute.5 
Upon the failure of a witness who has been properly granted im-
munity to testify or produce evidence after having been ordered to do 
so by the appropriate judge, the district attorney or attorney general 
shall institute contempt proceedings against the witness in the court 
where the alleged contempt occurred. If the witness, after a hearing, 
is adjudged in contempt of court, he shall be punished by imprison-
ment in the house of correction for a term not to exceed one year or 
until he complies with the order of the court, whichever occurs first. 
The witness then has the right to appeal to the Supreme Judicial 
Court an adjudication of contempt, and the Commonwealth has the 
right to appeal the failure to make an adjudication of contempt.6 
Lastly, the statute provides that no defendant in any criminal pro-
ceeding shall be convicted solely on the testimony of, or the evidence 
produced by, a person granted immunity under the act.7 
While the enactment of the immunity statute constituted a signif-
icant legislative event, an analysis of the act reveals its application and 
effect to be extraordinarily limited. First, a witness, to even be eligible 
for a grant of immunity at trial, must have already testified before 
the grand jury. Thus, the identity and whereabouts of the witness, as 
well as the information possessed by the witness, must all be known by 
the Commonwealth before the indictment. This places a heavy and 
unnecessary burden on the agencies of law enforcement, particularly 
when notorious crimes are involved which necessitate immediate in-
dictment; much valuable testimony and evidence will be lost. Secondly, 
the statute will be largely ineffective in combating organized crime, 
where extensive investigation prior to indictment is possible, because 
of the weak contempt penalties and possibility of exhaustive hearings 
and appeals. 
The first step in a meaningful attack on crime is amendatory legis-
lation to provide for original applications for grants of immunity to 
4Id. §20F. 
lild. §20G. 
61d. §20H. 
7 Id. §201. 
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he made before a judge of the Superior Court upon a claim of privilege 
against self-incrimination at the time of trial upon affidavit by the 
Commonwealth that the identity or location of, or information pos-
sessed by, the witness has been discovered subsequent to indictment. 
Additionally, the contempt punishment should be increased to deter 
refusals to testify or produce evidence. Unfortunately, the statute, in 
its present form and limited application, does not effectively prevent 
the frustration of justice. 
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